on the commentaries of Buddhaghosa have continued to attribute two truths to the Buddha himself".

4 According to Kalupahanaha op.cit.: 83, "these two types of discourses have nothing to do with conventional and ultimate truths".

5 Thus in the thought-world of early Buddhism there seems to be little basis for the distinction drawn by Nāṇatiloka: Guide through the Abhidhamma-pitaka, Kandy 1983: 2 between "philosophically incorrect 'conventional' every day language (vohāra-vacana)" and the Abhidhamma which employs "terms true in the absolute sense (paramattha-dhamma)". In fact, even the commentary to the Kathavatthu recognizes that sammutikathā is as true as paramatthakathā, KhV. 36. Hence, as pointed out by Jayatilleke op. cit.: 365, the notion that the former is somehow wrong is a late development.

6 Nāṇananda: Concept and Reality, Kandy 1986: 44.

7 Kalupahanaha op.cit.: IV.

VOSSAGGA stands for "letting go", in the sense of relinquishing, forsaking, or renouncing. Similar to the closely related paṭinissagga,"giving up", (which will also be discussed in the present article), vossagga has a considerable scope of activity in early Buddhism. Both terms can be seen to throw into relief a central theme that underlies the path to liberation from its outset to its final completion, namely the need to quite literally "let go" of any clinging whatsoever.

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Vossagga in a relatively mundane sense is part of a set of recommendations given in the Siṅgālavadā Sutta, according to which a householder should hand over authority to his wife, issariyavossagga (D. III, 190), and grant leave to his workers at the right time, samaye vossagga (D. III, 191). These practical instructions already involve at a deeper sense of vossagga, since in both instances what has to be let go off is control, whether this is in household affairs by handing over authority to the wife, or in labour matters by allowing the workers to take their leave. The desire to control that might render such letting go a difficult task is simply a particular prominent manifestation of clinging to a sense of I. Hence even with such mundane types of vossagga, as in the

References
1 For an examination of these two senses in Sanskrit and Chinese texts see Bapat: "Vohāra, Vyāhāra, Vyavahāra", Sanskrit and Indological Studies, Delhi 1975: 27-33.
3 Kalupahanaha: The Buddha's Philosophy of Language, Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha 1999: 81-82 explains that "the conception of two truths, the conventional and the ultimate ... in spite of the total absence of such a dichotomy in the early discourses, the interpreters ... who relied heavily

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As part of its pragmatic use of vohāra as commonly used ways of speech, early Buddhism also recognizes that there are limits to what can be expressed through the medium of spoken words. When questioned after the counterpart to Nibbāna, the nun Dhammadinnā made it clear that such a query goes beyond what can be given an answer, since Nibbāna is the final goal (M. I, 304). In a similar vein, when asked about the future destiny of an awakened one, according to a verse in the Sutta Nipāta the Buddha explained:

Atthaṅgatassa na pamūnām atthi,
yena na vañ ca tam tassa n’ athti,
sabbèsu dharmesu samūhatesu,
samāhitā vādaphathā pi sabbe.

"There is no measure for one who has gone out,
That by which one could speak of him no longer exists,
When all phenomena have come to an end,
Then all pathways for speech have also come to an end." (Snl. 1076).
present instance, a step is already taken in the direction of what according to early Buddhism needs above all to be given up: clinging to a sense of 'I'.

A correlate to clinging to an 'I' notion is the sense of ownership towards people, goods and possessions by grasping these as 'mine'. To gradually undermine this sense of ownership, vossagga is repeatedly recommended in the early discourses. Letting go of grasping at one's possessions leads to generosity, which manifests by "delighting in letting go", vossaggarato, in the sense of "delighting in giving and sharing", dānasagāvibhāgarato (S.V, 395). To be willing to let go in this way will become a source for a good reputation (A.I, 226) and lead to a heavenly rebirth (A.IV, 266). Having undertaken such letting go in the form of generosity in an earlier life was one out of the factors due to which Sakka was reborn as the ruler in the heaven of the Thirty-three (S.I, 228). The same form of letting go through generosity is also a clear token of faith for a Buddhist disciple (A.I, 150), in fact such generosity even features in listings of the four aspects of stream-entry, sotāpattiyaṁga, (S.V, 397). Having undertaken such letting go of one's possessiveness can then also be turned into an object of meditation, when one practices recollection of one's own generosity (A.III, 287).

This does not yet exhaust the relevance of vossagga to meditation practice. According to the canonical definition of the faculty of concentration, samādhihindriya, it is by "having made letting go the object" of one's mind that "one gains concentration and one-pointedness of the mind", vossaggārāmmaniyaṁ karitvā labhati samādhiṁ, labhati cittassa ekaggatāṁ. (S.V, 198). The passage that offers this definition continues with the standard description of the four jhānas, thereby indicating that the benefits of such letting go cover the whole gamut of concentrative depth of the mind. I in relation to the development of concentration, to let go would stand for letting go of concern with the world of the senses, first of all, and at more progressive stages of the practice also for letting go of the subjective sense of 'I', since it is only when this sense of 'I' goes into abeyance, allowing for a subjective experience of a merger between observing subject and observed meditative object, that entry into jhāna becomes possible. Preconditions for developing such letting go into deep meditative absorption are faith, energy and mindfulness (S.V, 225).

Vossagga also has a significant contribution to make in regard to the development of insight. This role comes to the fore in those passages that describe how the seven factors of awakening, bhojhaṁ, are to be developed in order to lead to knowledge and liberation. Such development of the factors of awakening should be undertaken based on seclusion, dispassion and cessation, culminating in letting go, vossaggaparahāṁ (e.g. M.III, 88). The same set-being based on seclusion, dispassion and cessation, and culminating in letting go - is relevant not only for the development of the seven factors of awakening, but also for developing the five faculties, indriya, the five powers, bala, and for the practice of the noble eightfold path (e.g. S.IV, 365-368).

The Paṭisambhidāmagga enumerates five types of vossagga developed in regard to each factor of the noble eightfold path with the break-through to liberating insight (Ps.II, 221):

(1) letting go by suppression, vikkhanbhana-vossagga,
(2) letting go by substitution of opposites, tadaṅga-vossagga,
(3) letting go by cutting off, samuccheda-vossagga,
(4) letting go by tranquillization, patippassaddhi-vossagga,
(5) letting go as an escape, nissara-pāvossagga.

The first of these, letting go by suppression, stands for the suppression of the hindrances; letting go by substitution of opposites stands for replacing the factors of the wrong path with those of the noble eightfold path; letting go by cutting off stands for cutting off defilements with the supramundane path; letting go by tranquillization refers to the supramundane fruit; and letting go as an escape represents Nibbāna.

In addition to distinguishing between these different types of vossagga related to the culmination point of the path, the Paṭisambhidāmagga also depicts the compass of vossagga in relation to the previous stages of the path of meditative development. According to its description, the theme of 'letting go' is relevant to each of the hindrances, which should be let go of by developing their opposites. Thus renunciation, for example, is the way to let go of sensual desire, nekkhammaṁ kāmacchedaṁ vossajjati vossaggo (Ps.II, 245). Implementation of the same basic principle of 'letting go' then is of continuous
relevance for the development of the four jhānas, of the four immaterial attainments, for the growth of insight into impermanence etc., and for attaining the four supramundane paths, where with the attainment of the path of arahants one lets go of all defilements, arahatamaggena sabbakilese vossaggi.

In this way, the discourses and the Patissambhidamagga highlight in complementary ways the continuous relevance of vossaggi in regard to any stage of the path. The same appears to be the case for paṭinissaggi, “giving up”. Before exploring the range of implications of paṭinissaggi, however, it needs to be noted that a discourse in the Aṅguttara Nikāya makes a point of specifying that not all forms of ‘giving up’ are recommendable. The type of giving up that leads to an increase in unwholesomeness should be avoided, and only the giving up that leads to an increase in wholesomeness should be undertaken (A. V. 192). The same is certainly also the case for ‘letting go’, vossaggā. This much can be gathered from the Vibhanga’s definition of heedlessness, pārāda, which speaks of ‘letting go’ of the mind in regard to the five strands of sensual pleasures, pātisasā kāmaguṇasā cittassa vossaggi (Vibh. 350). Evidently, such ‘letting go’ is not recommendable. Thus neither ‘letting go’ nor ‘giving up’ are to be practiced indiscriminately. Instead, both should be combined with a clear understanding of their purpose: increase in wholesome qualities and removal of unwholesome qualities.

While the term vossaggi occurs more frequently in recommendations to let go of material possessions through practising generosity, paṭinissaggi makes its appearance often in relation to the need to give up views. Thus various views about the past and the future are better given up (M. II, 235); and the whole of the Sālekkha Sutta sets out on the theme of giving up certain views, etāṁ dhammāṁ paṭinissaggi (M. I, 40); a theme also prominent in the treatment given to views in the Dīghanakha Sutta (M. I, 499). The profundity of this injunction becomes apparent in the concluding section of the Dīghanakha Sutta, according to which Sāriputta reached full liberation on realizing that the Buddha’s recommendation implied giving up all those things through penetrative insight, etasam tesam kirano Sugato dhammāṁ abhiññā paṭinissagam āha (M. I, 501).

A company where righteous speech prevails, dhammavādini parisā, is one whose members are able to ‘give up’ their views instead of insisting on them dogmatically (A. I, 76). Those who dogmatically hold on to their views, sandhīsāparipāram adhiśāyagāhī, will find it difficult to implement such giving up, dappadīsaggi (e.g. M. I, 96). The importance of being able to ‘give up’ one’s views is also reflected in several saṅghādisesa and pācittiya regulations in the Vinaya, which deal with monks or nuns who hold on to views that are mistaken or even have the potential of leading to a schism.3

In the context of actual meditation, paṭinissaggi makes its appearance as the last in the altogether sixteen steps of mindfulness of breathing, preceded by contemplation of impermanence, fading away and cessation, anicca, viññā and nirodha (M. III, 83). A similar series of progressive steps in the development of insight can, on being applied to feelings in general, lead to freedom from clinging to anything in the world and hence to liberation (M. I, 251). In relation to pleasant feelings such paṭinissaggi will lead to overcoming the underlying tendency to lust, rāgānusaya, in relation to painful feelings to overcoming the underlying tendency to irritation, paṭighānusaya, and in relation to neutral feelings to overcoming the underlying tendency to ignorance, avijjānusaya (S. IV, 211). Hence whatever feelings are experienced, the task is to contemplate their impermanence and eventually ‘give up’ all involvement with and attachment to them.

Not only in relation to feelings, but anything in the world of experience is best faced with paṭinissaggi. This can be seen in the Rūpapeyyālas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, which list an impressive range of practices that are related to the basic principle of giving up, paṭinissaggi. After enumerating a fairly comprehensive set of defilements, the Rūpapeyyālas indicate that to ‘give up’ these defilements can be undertaken through developing:

- samatha and vipassanā (A. I, 100);
- emptiness, signless and undirected concentration (A. I, 299);
- the four establishments of mindfulness (A. II, 256);
- the four right efforts (A. II, 256);
- the four roads to [spiritual] power (A. II, 256);
- the five faculties (A. III, 277);
- the five powers (A. III, 277);
- the six recollections (A. III, 452);
- the seven factors of awakening (A. IV, 148);
- the noble eightfold path (A. IV, 348);
- the four jhānas (A. IV, 465);
- the four brahmavihāras (A. V, 360);
- the four immaterial attainments (A. V, 360);
- the eight spheres of transcendence (A. IV, 348);
- the eight liberations (A. IV, 349);
- the attainment of cessation (A. IV, 465);

Hence paññissagga, similar to vossagga, spans the whole scale of meditative development. Perfecting giving up, then, requires giving up all craving, whereby the mind will be thoroughly liberared, tañhā ... paññissagga cittam svamimputti'nvuccati (S III, 13). Such giving up is the theme of the third noble truth, according to which the eradication of dukkha requires 'giving up' craving, tañhāyā paññissaggo (e.g. S. V, 421). It was through such 'giving up' of craving and of any sense of 'I' and 'mine' that the Buddha reached supreme awakening, tañhāgato sabbaso tañhānām ... paññissaggo anuttaram samāsambodhipi abhisambuddho (M. I, 6); tañhāgato ... sabbadaññakāramamamkāramānānāsayañānām ... paññissaggo anupādā vimutto (M. I, 486).

The Patissambhidānagga distinguishes between two types of paññissagga in relation to the breakthrough to liberating insight: giving up through relinquishment, pariccāgatapiñissagga, and giving up through leaping forward, pakkhandanapiñissagga (Ps. I, 194). A similar distinction in relation to vossagga is found in the commentaries, which speak of letting go through relinquishment, pariccāgavossagga, and letting go through leaping forward, pakkhandanavossagga (MA. I, 85). Whether it be 'letting go' or 'giving up', pariccaçga refers to relinquishing all aspects of existence, while pakkhandana stands for the mind that leaps forward to the experience of Nibbāna.

In sum, then, vossagga and paññissagga can be seen to highlight the same theme from complementary perspectives, in that 'letting go' and 'giving up' are of continuous relevance to progress towards liberation. The final goal of such progressive 'letting go' and 'giving up' is but a culmination of the same, as can be seen from one of the epithets used to describe the goal as sabbipadhipatinissagga, the "giving up of all substrata" (e.g. M. I, 436). Hence 'letting go' or 'giving up', if practised wisely in such a way that it results in a growth of wholesome qualities, could be considered a succinct way of representing the central thrust of the teachings of early Buddhism.

... attapatiñissaggo, anupādāya ye ratā, khinjasavajutinanto, te loke parinibbutā.
Giving up acquisitiveness,
And delighting in not clinging,
[With] influxes destroyed and brilliant [with wisdom],
These have attained Nibbāna in this world (Dhp. 89).

References
1 Keeping in mind that the immaterial attainments do not differ from the fourth jhāna in terms of concentrative depth of the mind, but only in respect of having more refined objects.
3 Vin. III, 173; Vin. III, 175; Vin. III, 178; Vin. III, 184; Vin. IV, 135; Vin. IV, 218; Vin. IV, 236; Vin. IV, 238; Vin. IV, 239; Vin. IV, 241; Vin. IV, 294.
Another regulation concerned with paññissagga is when monks are enjoined to give up taking meals at improper times (M. I, 448).

VYĀPĀDA, sometimes spelled vyapāda, stands for "ill-will". The negative repercussions of vyapāda are treated from a set of related angles in early Buddhism, wherefor vyapāda makes its appearance in a fair number of categories that describe unwholesome states or tendencies. The present article will begin by surveying occurrences of vyapāda in these categories, followed by turning to its arising, its consequences and the way to overcome it.

Vyapāda as a Manifestation of Wrong Intention

Vyapāda is one of the three types of wrong intention, which are the intention of sensuality, kāmasaṅkappa, the intention of ill-will, vyapādasuṅkappa, and the intention of harming, vihimsāsakappa (e.g. M. III, 73; see also VIHIMSA). These three types of intention stand in direct