On the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*

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**Introduction**

In this article I examine the narrative structure of the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*, arguing that the discourse can be read as a coherent presentation. I take the occasion to reply to criticism raised by Wynne (2018a) of my comparative study of this discourse. In the final part of the present article, I also reply to Wynne (2019) regarding an ongoing debate on the two paths theory.

**The Main Structure of the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta***

The main narrative structure found in the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* and its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* proceeds as follows:

1) The monk Sāti upholds the view that the same consciousness transmigrates through the round of rebirths, in spite of being censured for this claim by other monks. Called to the Buddha’s presence, he has to face a firm rebuke for his mistaken idea.

2) The Buddha explains that consciousness is dependently arisen, comparable to fire that depends on fuel.

3) The Buddha engages the monks in a catechism on the dependent nature of what ‘has come to be’.

4) The Buddha expounds the four nutriments, tracing their conditioned arising from craving back to ignorance;

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next he outlines dependent arising via the standard twelve links from ignorance to old age and death and back again to ignorance; and then he covers the cessation mode of dependent arising in forward and reverse order.

5) In response to questioning by the Buddha, the monks in attendance affirm their disinterest in speculations about the self.

6) The Buddha examines the conditions for the formation of a foetus and then depicts how, once grown up, the person delights in feeling, which then gives rise to the ensuing links of dependent arising.

7) A reference to the arising of a Tathāgata serves in the Pāli version as an occasion for a full account of the gradual path of training up to the fourth absorption, following which the Buddha describes mental balance towards anything experienced at a sense-door.

The Topic of the Discourse

The Mahāṭathāsaṅkhaya-sutta ends with the Buddha telling the monks that they should keep this discourse in mind as an instruction on the topic of “liberation by the destruction of craving”, qualifying the teaching given as being “concise” or “succinct”, saṅkhitta. The Madhyama-āgama parallel also concludes by indicating that this discourse is about “liberation by the destruction of craving”, but without qualifying the instruction as succinct.

Thus the two versions agree on the main theme of the instruction but differ as to whether this particular teaching given by the Buddha should be considered as succinct. This difference would imply that either a reference to the conciseness of the discourse has been lost in the Madhyama-āgama version or else it has been added to the Majjhima-nikāya discourse.

When exploring these alternatives, the preceding discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya, the Cūḷatathāsaṅkhaya-sutta, can be

1 MN 38 at MN I 270, 37: saṅkhittena taṇhāsaṅkhayavimuttidhāretha.

2 MA 201 at T I 769c29: 此經稱愛盡解脫; the actual title of the discourse differs, however, cf. Anālayo 2011: 251 note 227.
consulted. The Cūḷatathāsankhaya-sutta reports an instruction on liberation by the destruction of craving, tanhāsankhayavimutti, given by the Buddha to Sakka. According to the narrative setting, Sakka had explicitly asked for an instruction that is “succinct”, sankhitta. The teaching given by the Buddha in reply to this request is indeed concise, unlike his much longer teaching in the Mahātathāsankhaya-sutta. In the Cūḷatathāsankhaya-sutta, this brief teaching then leads on to a prolonged encounter between Sakka and Mahāmoggallāna, as a result of which the discourse becomes long enough to find a place among the collection of middle-length discourses. Had the discourse been solely about the succinct instruction itself, it could have been more conveniently placed in a collection of shorter discourses.

During its report of the encounter between Sakka and Mahāmoggallāna, the Cūḷatathāsankhaya-sutta refers back to the Buddha’s “succinct” instruction on “liberation by the destruction of craving” as many as ten times. The recurrent qualification of the “liberation by the destruction of craving” as “succinct” in the Cūḷatathāsankhaya-sutta could easily have misled the reciters of the Majjhima-nikāya to apply this qualification to the otherwise same expression “liberation by the destruction of craving” when reciting the next discourse, the Mahātathāsankhaya-sutta, even though in this case such a qualification does not fit the context. This makes it fair to assume that the second of the two alternative options envisaged above could fit the case, namely that the expression “succinct” was added to the Mahātathāsankhaya-sutta. This could have occurred as the result of a simple error during oral transmission.

Wynne (2018a: 110), however, takes the reference to a concise exposition at the end of the Mahātathāsankhaya-sutta to imply that the discourse has been expanded, reasoning that, if it ever was a ‘concise’ discourse it must have been expanded in the course of its transmission. We will keep this in mind as we analyze the different portions of the text, for a redaction of a concise discourse into a very complex one is

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3 MN 37 at MN I 251,17: kītāvatā nu kho, bhante, bhikkhu sankhittena tanhāsankhayavimutto hoti?

unlikely to have been carried out seamlessly. Redactors leave ‘fingerprints’: if the text was expanded, a close analysis might reveal thematic and terminological discontinuities.

The Nutriments and Dependent Arising

In search of such fingerprints in the Mahāṭānhaśāṅkhaya-sutta, Wynne (2018a: 119) has come to the conclusion that its “section 4 is an interpolation”. Chief arguments in support of this conclusion, as far as I am able to tell, would be the following:

The four nutriments of section 4 are material food (subtle or gross), contact, mental intention (manosaṅcetanā) and ‘sentience’ (viññāna). This disagrees with section 3, which talks about viññāna not as a nutriment, but as a result of nutriment …

The four nutriments are said to depend on a causal sequence which includes some of the four nutriments: viññāna and ‘contact’ are ‘nutriments’, but they are apparently caused by themselves. In other words, they are both cause and effect, and the same is probably true of the third nutriment – ‘mental intention’–if this is equivalent to mental constructions/volitions (saṅkhārā), the second link in the chain of dependent origination.

Wynne (2018a: 119f) concludes that

the addition of a twelvefold version of dependent origination creates incoherence, and directs attention away from the meaning of the Buddha’s encounter with Sāti. Hence section 4 is out of step with the teaching to the teaching [sic] on personal identity which surrounds it … section 4 thus obscures the meaning of a very important aspect of early Buddhist thought: the Buddha’s encounter with Upaniṣadic essentialism.

The presumed incoherence involves the speculations about the self, taken up in section 5 of the Mahāṭānhaśāṅkhaya-sutta. According to the assessment by Wynne (2018a: 120), section 5 should not be preceded by an exposition of the twelve links of dependent arising (as found in section 4), as in this way the monks’ indifference to such speculations
is not because the bhikkhus understand that such questions are inappropriate, but rather because the correct answer has already been given. In short, to the question ‘did we exist in the past … what were we in the past?’, dependent origination in its twelvefold form provides an answer along the lines ‘yes, we did exist in the past, in the form of a specific sequence of individual continuity.’

Regarding the first argument about a disagreement between sections 3 and 4, it needs to be noted that section 3 does not explicitly refer to consciousness, viññāna. In other words, this argument is based on the assumption that the reference to what has come to be, bhūtam, must refer to viññāna (Wynne 2018a: 114). Although this is of course possible, as Wynne (2018a: 113) notes himself, the commentary rather takes the phrase bhūtaṁ idam to refer to all five aggregates.5

The same expression occurs in a discourse in the Samyutta-nikāya as part of an exegesis of a verse from the Pārīyana-vagga.6 Both the Samyutta-nikāya discourse and the Mahātānāsāṅkhaya-sutta continue with a reference to the origination of what has come to be due to nutriment, tadāhārasambhavam. Nevertheless, no reference to consciousness, viññāna, can be found in either the relevant part of this Samyutta-nikāya discourse or in the Pārīyana-vagga verse. The commentary on the Samyutta-nikāya also understands the phrase bhūtaṁ idam to intend all five aggregates.7

Turning to the situation in the Chinese Āgama parallels, the Madhyama-āgama discourse has as its counterpart to the reference to bhūtaṁ idam (in the Mahātānāsāṅkhaya-sutta) the phrase “truly said”, 真説,8 apparently taking whatever equivalent to Pāli bhūtaṁ was found in its Indic original in the sense of bhūta as “truth”. This is not an isolated understanding by Gautama Saṅghadeva, the translator of the Madhyama-āgama, as the other occurrence of the expression bhūtaṁ idam in the Samyutta-nikāya discourse commenting on the verse from the Pārīyana-vagga has

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5 Ps II 307,12.
6 SN 12.31 at SN II 48,4; commenting on Sn 1038. The assessment of this text by Wynne 2018a: 125 as “relatively late”, without any consultation of parallel versions, is unconvincing.
7 Spk II 61,3.
8 MĀ 201 at T I 767b12.
its counterpart in “truth”, 真實, in a Samyukta-āgama parallel translated by Baoyun.\(^9\)

Whatever value one may be willing to accord to the two commentarial explanations and to the understandings of the Chinese translators of the Madhyama-āgama and the Samyukta-āgama respectively, there is clearly room for different understandings of the cryptic phrase bhūtaṃ idaṃ.

Given that the relevant section in the Mahātānhaśaṅkhaya-sutta does not mention viññāṇa explicitly, it is not really possible to construe an incoherence on the mere assumption that this section must be a reference to consciousness. After all, it is only because of this particular interpretation that the assumed incoherence has materialized. This would perhaps more naturally call into question the interpretation rather than the coherence of the discourse itself.

Regarding the second argument concerning a mention of both cause and effect, it needs to be kept in mind that even the standard formulation of dependent arising (paṭicca samuppāda) by way of twelve links shows a similar feature. Name in the fourth link of name-and-form is elsewhere explained as corresponding to feeling, perception, intention, contact, and attention.\(^10\) Yet, contact is also the sixth link and feeling the seventh link in the standard formulation of dependent arising. When such a recurrence is already found in the standard set of twelve links, it can hardly be employed as an argument for a supposed incoherence of section 4 in the Mahātānhaśaṅkhaya-sutta.

As for the third argument about the incoherent placement of the exposition of dependent arising before the monks affirm their disinterest in speculations about the self, a discourse in the Samyutta-nikāya that takes up the same series of speculations can be considered in the light of its parallels preserved in Chinese translation and Sanskrit fragments.\(^11\) The parallel versions agree in

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\(^9\) SĀ 345 at T II 95b17.

\(^10\) See, e.g., SN 12.2 at SN II 3,34 and its parallel EĀ 49.5 at T II 797b28.

\(^11\) SĀ 296 at T II 84b27 and S 474 folio 11 V7-10, Tripāṭhi 1962: 40, parallels to SN 12.20 at SN II 26,27. Wynne 2018a: 125 comments that SN 12.20 “looks like a fairly late composition” due to the occurrence of some rare terminology. Yet, frequency of occurrence does not equal earliness. Some very rare terms can be quite ancient. Besides, the parallels to SN 12.20 have a similar presentation. Here as well as elsewhere, it is important that
clarifying that a noble disciple is beyond such speculations due to insight into dependent arising. This shows that it is indeed meaningful for the Mahātānāsākhyā-sutta to proceed from a depiction of dependent arising in section 4 to the absence of speculations about the self in section 5. Thus the suggestion that section 4 must be a later interpolation remains unconvincing.

In sum, none of the arguments discussed above suffices to establish section 4 as an obvious interpolation. Yet, according to Wynne (2018a: 118), with section 4

the Buddha has apparently gone off on a tangent. What had been a discussion of Sāti’s error, the dependent nature of viññāna and its ‘nutriment’ or generation, is now an analysis of individual continuity over time (and lifetimes).

Rather than reflecting a tangent, section 4 could instead be seen as targeting precisely the problem of Sāti’s error, which was about continuity during the round of rebirths. From this viewpoint, section 4 can be considered an appropriate response to Sāti’s view that the same consciousness transmigrates.

In fact, the exact opposite of Alexander Wynne’s hypothesis could also be proposed, namely that section 4 is original and what precedes and follows it is a later addition. I now present such an alternative case, in order to document that subjective impressions of coherence can differ and are for this reason not sufficient in themselves to determine the lateness of a particular passage. This is not a reflection of my own opinion on the narrative coherence of the Mahātānāsākhyā-sutta, but instead merely an attempt to show that alternative perspectives are possible.

In order to argue for such an alternative position, it could be contended that it is unexpected for the Buddha to involve the other monks in a question and answer catechism. It is certainly meaningful for him to give a teaching to the entire monastic congregation present on that occasion, but for him to question the other monks closely would make better sense if they had somehow shown signs of having misunderstood his teachings. Yet, the one who misunderstood what the Buddha had taught was Sāti, whereas the other monks had been trying their best to convince him of his

assessments of lateness are considered in the light of the evidence that can be garnered from a comparative study of parallels.
mistake. There seems therefore little reason for the Buddha to question the monks as to whether they had doubts about what ‘has come to be’, as he does in section 3, since their earlier behaviour had already shown them to be beyond such doubts. Nor does it seem particularly clear why he should ask the monks if they entertain meaningless speculations about the self in relation to past, future, and present, as he does in section 5. One might suspect such speculations to have been entertained by Sāti, but not by those who tried to convince him of his wrong view.

Instead of querying the monks, as he does in sections 3 and 5, the Buddha should have directly targeted Sāti’s misunderstanding of the nature of consciousness by expounding dependent arising, as he does in section 4.

In sum, based on the reasoning just delineated, one might propose that sections 3 and 5 are the later interpolations. Removing these, the hypothetical original discourse would then be as follows (leaving aside sections 6 and 7 for the time being):

1) The monk Sāti upholds the view that the same consciousness transmigrates through the round of rebirths, in spite of being censured for this claim by other monks. Called to the Buddha’s presence, he has to face a firm rebuke for his mistaken idea.

2) The Buddha explains that consciousness is dependently arisen, comparable to fire that depends on fuel.

4) The Buddha expounds the four nutriments, tracing their conditioned arising from craving back to ignorance; next outlines dependent arising via the standard twelve links from ignorance to old age and death and back again to ignorance, and then covers the cessation mode of dependent arising in forward and reverse order.

This alternative hypothesis results in a sequence as meaningful as the one proposed by Alexander Wynne. On this alternative hypothesis, the Buddha continues directly from expounding the conditionality of consciousness in relation to the six senses to its role as one of the four nutriments, which serve as a maintenance for living beings that have come to be and that are about to come to be.\textsuperscript{12} This directly addresses Sāti’s misunderstanding of the nature of consciousness by expounding dependent arising.

\textsuperscript{12} MN 38 at MN I 261,5: \textit{bhi\text{"u}tānaṃ vā sattānaṃ \text{"u}thiyā, sambhavesināṃ vā}

standing about transmigration without any need to engage the other monks in a catechism on the dependent nature of what ‘has come to be’ or to verify their disinterest in speculations about the self.

In order to prevent potential misunderstandings, I would like to repeat that the above alternative hypothesis does not reflect my own view of the narrative coherence of the discourse. Instead, it is only meant to show that subjective assumptions about coherence of ideas can differ. For this reason, they do not suffice on their own to distinguish between earlier and later layers of a discourse and, in my view, should not be made the sole basis for taking a definite stance on which parts of a text are later additions. Instead of relying on perceived thematic and terminological discontinuities, assessments of earlier and later strata are preferably made based on solid evidence, such as the absence of the passage in question from a parallel version. A case in point would be the qualification “concise” or “succinct”, sankhītta, discussed earlier. Here we do have a clear-cut difference between the parallel versions, albeit a minor one. Hence there is indeed room for constructing hypotheses regarding which of the two discourses has preserved the earlier version of this part of the text.

Comparative Study of the Mahātānāsāṅkhaya-sutta

Wynne (2018a: 123f) quotes from my comparative study of the Mahātānāsāṅkhaya-sutta and then adds his criticism of the same as follows: ‘‘the present discourse’s main concern … is dependent arising’ (Anālayo 2011: 256). This judgement overlooks significant differences within the text, and papers over the cracks that run through the early Buddhist tradition.”

The context of my statement is an evaluation of the appropriateness of the gradual path account in the Mahātānāsāṅkhaya-sutta in the light of the apparent absence of such an account in the Madhyama-āgama parallel. The passage in question reads in full:

The present discourse’s main concern, however, is dependent arising, which would not require a full account of the gradual path of training. The audience of the Buddha

anuggahāya; Wynne 2018a: 119 considers this to be an addition to the discourse.
in this particular instance are monks who are already disciples in higher training. Thus the members of his audience would have been well acquainted with the gradual path of training from their own experience and would therefore not need to be given a detailed account of it. These points would support the presentation in the Madhyama-āgama version, which does not have a full account of the gradual path.

Rather than overlooking significant differences, my concern is precisely to study them. The accusation that this statement “papers over the cracks that run through the early Buddhist tradition” seems groundless, as the very purpose of the discussion in this passage is to show that the Pāli version could be the result of an expansion of the text.

Wynne (2018a: 124) continues his criticism as follows: “The same tendency to homogenize can be seen in Anālayo’s description of the account of personal maturation and habituation to pleasure”. The passage that supposedly reflects a tendency to homogenize proceeds as follows (Anālayo 2011: 255):

The Mahātanhāsaṅkhaya-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel report how, after successful conception, following the period of the mother’s pregnancy a child is born, grows up, and develops a liking for pleasant experiences and a dislike for unpleasant ones. The grown-up thereby delights in feeling, which in turn leads to the remaining links of dependent arising. In both versions, the present passage thus forms a practical application of the previous treatment of dependent arising by way of its twelve links in forward and backward order, illustrating how delight in feeling leads to clinging and therewith to the conditioned arising of dukkha.

Alexander Wynne objects:

There is nothing ‘practical’ about the idea of a gandhabba descending into the mother’s womb, and in no way is the statement that the young boy starts to play games an application, of any sort, of the twelvefold chain of Dependent Origination.

The objection seems to be based on a misunderstanding. As the full quote above shows, my concern is not the gandhabba’s
descent into the mother’s womb but what happens afterwards, when the person in question has grown up and delights in sensual pleasures. My comment is about a passage that comes later and which takes up the remaining links of dependent arising, where delight in feeling at the six sense doors leads to clinging, becoming, and birth, etc. This passage involves an application of the principle of dependent arising to what I would consider a “practical” illustrative situation (compared to just a bare listing of the links of dependent arising as such), namely the enjoyment of sense objects that are related to sensual desire.

The Two Paths Theory

In line with the above accusation of homogenizing, in another article Wynne (2018b) has raised a series of criticisms of my assessment of the theory that early Buddhist thought reflects two opposing paths to awakening (based on either intellectual reflection on its own or else on the attainment of absorption). In a detailed reply in Anālayo (2018), I have shown that his allegations were, without exception, incorrect.

I appreciate very much that, in his latest reply, Wynne (2019: 149) begins on a more conciliatory note that sets quite a different tone compared to Wynne (2018b). Nevertheless, the remainder of his article still contains allegations that force me to reply, which I hope to present in a spirit of non-contentiousness and solely for the sake of clarification.

It seems to me that Alexander Wynne might not have fully appreciated the purpose behind my listing in Anālayo (2018) of the dissenting scholarship that he has not taken into account. My main concern was to defend myself against his earlier criticism. The particular point I made is that both of his studies of the two paths theory, Wynne (2007: 117–120) and (2018b), do not mention dissenting scholarship. I felt obligated to draw attention to this because disregard of dissenting scholarship was one of the criticisms he had raised against me, although my writings on this topic had actually covered a range of publications voicing opinions contrary to my own.

The issue here is not the degree to which he now finds pertinent the arguments made by scholars critical of the two path theory (evaluations that might have found a better placing in his
earlier publications). It is therefore not the case, as assumed by Wynne (2019: 160), that my argument is rendered redundant by my “failure to cite any telling critique from them.” The point under discussion is a failure to mention dissenting scholarship in the first place, thereby risking that a reader of his contributions comes away with the impression that, previous to my own writings, there has not been a single scholar expressing disagreement with the two paths theory.

Although Wynne (2019: 149) explains that he was unaware of some of the dissenting works mentioned by me, I had actually given reference to these works not only in footnotes, but also in the main text of my earlier discussion (Anālayo 2016: 40f). It is difficult to see how he could not have been aware of these publications if he had carefully read the article that formed the target of his criticism.

In reply to another of his allegations, according to which I did not take the texts seriously, I had shown that this appears to apply rather to his own treatment of the phrase atthapadāmaṃ in AN 6.46. Based on omitting an occurrence of the term in AN 9.4, Wynne (2018b: 83) concluded that, as far as occurrences of atthapadāmaṃ in Pāli discourses are concerned, “the term only occurs in the definition of the Dhamma devotees at AN 6.46, and in one other Sutta, AN 4.192.” Based on this assessment, he was then able to consider these Dhamma devotees to have been “liberated Arahants”, a consideration crucial for his overall argument.

The way he arrived at this conclusion is faulty. On the very same page of his discussion, he refers to AN 9.4 as an instance where the term in question occurs. My pointing out that this occurrence should have been taken into account when drawing his earlier conclusion is not a case of “misrepresenting” his analysis of AN 6.46, pace Wynne (2019: 159). The case is quite unequivocal: A conclusion has been drawn based on not taking into account a relevant passage that was clearly known.

13 The assumption of a less than careful reading might also explain why, even though in Anālayo 2018 I made it clear that my first contribution to the topic is Anālayo 2015 (contrary to Alexander Wynne’s assumption that I had provided proper arguments only in 2017), in his introductory survey Wynne 2019: 149 does not mention this publication and only refers to Anālayo 2016 (misspelled as 2106) and 2017 as my previous writings on the issue.
In his present reply, Wynne (2019: 158–160) tries to remedy the earlier omission by arguing that AN 9.4 actually fits his interpretation that the Dhamma devotees in AN 6.46 are liberated arahants. The point at stake is whether the occurrence of *atthapadam* as the third in a list of five ascending benefits, described in AN 9.4, should be understood to imply full awakening. As the fifth benefit explicitly mentions full awakening, I had argued that this prevents considering the third benefit to refer to the same. In reply, Wynne (2019: 158) correctly points out that this fifth benefit differs from the preceding three, as it concerns the audience and not the speaker. Yet, the fourth benefit is about the speaker being either on the path to attainment or else having reached it, whereas the second benefit is about the speaker gaining inspiration. Given the ascending nature of the list, it follows that the third benefit must refer to the speaker gaining a benefit somewhere in between inspiration and being on the path to attainment; it does not work to take it as a referent to the highest attainment of full awakening. Nevertheless, Wynne (2019: 160) concludes that although Anālayo has attacked my supposedly ‘disconcerting’ treatment of AN 9.4, his critique is undermined by his misreading of this text. To adapt a phrase from Richard Gombrich, a mountain has been made out of a non-existent molehill.

His interpretation of AN 9.4 can hardly be considered so self-evident that “there is no other possible reading” of this passage, as assumed now by Wynne (2019: 159). Anyway, the omission of AN 9.4 when drawing conclusions regarding occurrences of *atthapadam* in Pāli discourses stands, independent of how one views the implications of the passage.

This is not really a case of a non-existent molehill that has been turned into a mountain. This metaphor had its proper place in a critique voiced by Gombrich (1990) of untenable conclusions drawn by Schopen (1989), based on the absence of monastic regulations concerning the cult of *stupas* in the Pāli *Vinaya*. Whereas such conclusions based on an absence of references can indeed be illustrated with the example of non-existent molehills, Alexander Wynne’s criticism falls into a different category. It seems to me to be rather a case of throwing stones when living in a glass house.
Conclusion

The qualification of the *Mahātānāthaṃśaṅkhaya-sutta* as offering a “succinct” instruction on liberation by the destruction of craving could be the result of an error during oral transmission, caused by a recurrent use of the same qualification in the preceding discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya*. The complex narrative structure of the *Mahātānāthaṃśaṅkhaya-sutta* could be reduced in various ways, yet such a procedure does not necessarily lead to a convincing reconstruction of its original form. Evaluations of parts of the text as being earlier or later would be considerably more convincing if based on actual differences discernible by a comparative study of parallel versions extant in different transmission lineages. Moreover, giving due recognition to dissenting scholarship and conflicting evidence in primary sources are important assets in academic research and writing.

Abbreviations

AN  *Aṅguttara-nikāya*
EĀ  *Ekottarika-āgama* (T 125)
MĀ  *Madhyama-āgama* (T 26)
MN  *Majjhima-nikāya*
Ps  *Papañcasūdani* (commentary on MN)
SĀ  *Samyukta-āgama* (T 99)
SHT  Sanskrit Handschriften aus den Turfanfunden
SN  *Samyutta-nikāya*
Sn  *Sutta-nipāta*
Spk  *Sāratthapakasini* (commentary on SN)
T  Taishō edition (CBETA)
References


